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WBECAUSE UTILITIES BEAR WATCHING
Second in a Two-Part Series
by Beth Givens*
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Following is
Part II of a two-part feature article on
citizens' utility boards. Part I was the
feature article in the Spring 1991 issue
of the California Regulatory Law
Reporter. Both parts are condensed from
a longer report published by CPIL in
1991.
Part I chronicled the early develop-
ment of CUBs in the 1970s and profiled
the four existing CUBs in Wisconsin,
Illinois, Oregon and California.
Part II discusses CUB funding mech-
anisms, with emphasis on inserts in mass
mailings and intervenor compensation.
It also covers structural issues concern-
ing governance and variations on the
CUB concept. Part 11 concludes with a
discussion of thefuture of the CUB con-
cept.]
CUB FUNDING
The ideal funding mechanism, not
only for CUBs but for any consumer
advocacy organization, ensures a stable,
consistent and sufficient source of rev-
enue, free from political and special
interest influences. When CUBs were
allowed to enclose their membership
appeals in utility bills, they were able to
approach that ideal, at least in the first
years of operation.
Loss of enclosure privileges after the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in
PG&E v. PUC' forced CUBs to rely on
other means of raising funds, primarily
direct mail appeals and door-to-door
canvassing. Not only are these methods
less effective, they are also more costly,
leaving CUBs with less revenue to carry
out their advocacy work.
A creative solution to the curtailment
of utility bill enclosures has emerged in
Illinois. In 1987 the Illinois legislature
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passed a bill authorizing CUB to enclose
its messages in the mass mailings of
state agencies. This method passes con-
stitutional muster and preserves CUB's
low-cost means of communicating with
virtually the same spectrum of Illinois
residents as allowed by utility bill enclo-
sures.
This section looks at the effectiveness
of both utility bill enclosures and state
agency inserts for CUB membership
solicitations. It also discusses alternative
forms of utility bill inserts to inform util-
ity customers about consumer groups
that intervene in regulatory proceedings.
It closes with a discussion of the impor-
tance of "intervenor compensation" pro-
grams as an alternative or supplemental
means of supporting the work of CUBs.
Utility Bill Inserts:
How They Worked
Wisconsin CUB. The Wisconsin
CUB, the nation's first, has the longest
history of enclosing its messages in utili-
ty bills. It enclosed membership appeals
in a total of 91 utility mailings from
1980 through 1985. CUB prepared 31
different enclosure texts during that
time. As required by statute, the text for
each insert was reviewed by the Public
Service Commission (PSC) prior to
mailing. In practice, the text was submit-
ted simultaneously to the utility and the
PSC approximately six weeks before its
billing date. If the utility objected to the
enclosure's content, the PSC then
reviewed it to ensure that, as required by
the statute, the CUB text was not "false
or misleading." 2
Because CUB was required to pay for
all extra postage if its enclosure tipped
the utility bill's scales over one ounce,
weight was an important consideration
for CUB enclosures. Each was designed
to be a self-contained mailer weighing
one-half ounce or less-one sheet of
paper printed front and back that, when
folded and glued shut, would function as
a return envelope to CUB.
Each insert was required to carry a
prominently placed statement explaining
that the insert was "not from your utility
company." Even to the most absent-
minded utility customer, however, there
was probably no mistaking that the
enclosure was neither the utility bill nor
a newsletter from the utility, much less a
legal notice from the Public Service
Commission.
CUB proclaimed its mission boldly.
The first enclosure asked customers of
Wisconsin Bell, "Are you mad as #!!#
about your phone bills?" It invited
ratepayers to join the new advocacy
group and support it in fighting for lower
rates and better policies. Another insert
exhorted, "Please read this BEFORE
you pay your bill!" It asked, "Do you
wish you had a lawyer to fight high utili-
ty rates?!! YOU DO!!"
When CUB's work contributed*to
lower rates, CUB communicated its suc-
cesses to utility customers in its enclo-
sures and urged them to support CUB
through membership donations. "You be
the judge...Does CUB save you mon-
ey??? A million and a half dollars says
we do." The text described how the PSC
decided that, based on information pro-
vided by CUB, a Wisconsin Power and
Light rate reduction was in order. An
insert to Wisconsin Bell customers
described how the phone company
obtained windfall profits following the
break-up of AT&T. CUB alerted the PSC
to the situation and the utility customers
were subsequently awarded a $14.65
refund. "Only tough legal and account-
ing experts working to protect ratepayers
can create the legal record for another
good decision. That's what CUB is all
about. Our staff will be there for you-if
you help."
CUB's enclosures played an educa-
tional role as well. Beyond the headlines,
the text explained some of the intrica-
cies of ratemaking proceedings. One en-
closure described how "construction
allowances" and "phantom taxes" of
Madison Gas and Electric were con-
tributing to requests for higher rates. A
phone bill enclosure explained why the
one dollar "access fee" was tacked onto
local phone bills as a result of divesti-
ture. The enclosure protested the charge
and suggested that phone customers
write letters of protest to the Federal
Communications Commission, the agen-
cy that ordered the access fee, as well as
congressional representatives.
CUB succeeded in keeping its enclo-
sures to a minimum weight, thereby sav-
ing thousands of dollars on postage fees.
CUB estimated that if it had to pay the
cost of postage, labels, envelopes
and staff time, the mailings to utility
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customers would cost nearly five times
as much as they did. With utility bills as
the vehicle to reach ratepayers, CUB's
primary cost was limited to designing
and printing the enclosures. 3
UCAN. The enclosures of the Utility
Consumers' Action Network (UCAN)
followed a similar pattern. The local
CUB, established in San Diego, Califor-
nia, in 1983, inserted its messages in the
monthly bills of San Diego Gas and
Electric Company (SDG&E) a total of
eight times over a two-year period.
UCAN's first enclosure, mailed in
August 1983, asked utility customers,
"Why do you think this bill is so
high?...Because SDG&E has many
lawyers, rate experts and accountants to
influence the public utilities commis-
sion...and you do not. Now you have the
chance to even the odds." The enclosure
went on to describe the "landmark deci-
sion" of the state's Public Utilities Com-
mission (PUC) that created UCAN and
invited San Diegans to join the new
organization.
A subsequent enclosure described
how UCAN's representation would
benefit ratepayers in an upcoming PUC
proceeding to be held in San Francisco.
...The lead attorney for SDG&E
rises from his chair in the large
hearing room. He motions to a
stack of hundreds of pages of
utility documents on the table
before him and introduces his co-
counsel from SDG&E, all sitting
in an impressive row behind
counsel table. Then he introduces
the expert witnesses.. He makes
an impressive opening statement,
citing studies by SDG&E...He
concludes by asking for an
increase in rates for 1984.
Then a figure from the opposite
side of the room rises, a person
new to the five commissioners
who must decide the issue. He is
your attorney. He begins by intro-
ducing his co-counsel, his expert
witnesses and his documents. He
begins his opening statement
with a critique of the rate increase
request: "...We shall show that
the rate base figures of SDG&E
are inflated, that several cate-
gories of expense are not justified
and that the increase would yield
too high a return on equity to
SDG&E stockholders...."
The five commissioners are
about to balance, as they must,
preventing excessive profits
against a fair rate of return for
SDG&E's stockholders. But now
it's a fair contest. Your side is
going to be heard....The cost to
you? $4.00. Can you find a better
value in legal representation?
UCAN's enclosures were similar in
format to Wisconsin's. They adhered to
strict weight limitations and contained a
disclosure that the message was not from
SDG&E. UCAN did not have to submit
its enclosure texts to the time-consuming
review process that was required for all
Wisconsin CUB messages, however.
When the PUC authorized the formation
of UCAN, it took a hands-off stance and
did not specify a review process. In fact,
it ordered that the enclosures must state
that "their contents have neither been
reviewed nor endorsed by this Commis-
sion." 4 The PUC said it was confident
that UCAN and SDG&E could work
together to "overcome any problems and
permit the ratepayers the opportunity to
experience the full implementation of
UCAN." 5 Throughout the two-year time
period that UCAN had access to billing
envelopes, neither SDG&E nor UCAN
filed any formal complaints with the
PUC.
Enclosure Return Rates. The three
CUBs that inserted their messages in
utility bills-in Wisconsin, Illinois and
California--drew a sufficient number of
members within the first year to begin
significant participation in the regulatory
process on behalf of their constituency.
They were able to attract a large enough
membership base to reach the critical
mass required to become fully opera-
tional in far less time than organizations
which rely upon the more traditional
fundraising methods of direct mail
appeals and door-to-door canvassing:
Enclosure return rates for both
UCAN and Wisconsin CUB followed
similar and predictable patterns. (Illi-
nois' experience will be discussed
below.) The first enclosure drew the
largest number of members. The return
rate on subsequent enclosures decreased
by about half, stabilizing at about a 0.5%
rate of return.
UCAN's first enclosure garnered a
return of 35,000 members out of 850,000
ratepayer households in the San Diego
service area, a phenomenal 4% rate of
return. The second enclosure, three
months later, attracted 15,000 new mem-
bers, somewhat less than half the first
return rate. Two years and eight enclo-
sures after the formation of UCAN, it
had attracted 70,000 members, about 8%
of SDG&E's utility customers. UCAN
executive director Michael Shames, at
that time a law student at the University
of San Diego who had been instrumental
in getting UCAN off the ground, said,
"We expected maybe six to ten thousand
members total. The idea of 70,000 mem-
bers was unthinkable."
' 6
The surprisingly large membership of
UCAN allowed the new organization to
operate with an annual budget of
$340,000 in 1984 and 1985. Although $4
was the minimum amount required for
membership, the average contribution
was $7. UCAN had a staff of three full-
time professionals and contracted with a
legal firm in San Francisco which spe-
cialized in utility matters. With the loss
of the bill enclosure privilege, UCAN's
annual budget has since dropped to
approximately $150,000.
The enclosure returns of the Wiscon-
sin CUB started at approximately 2%,
then steadily decreased to return rates of
0.2% to 0.6%. Unlike UCAN, the
Wisconsin CUB is a statewide organiza-
tion, able to enclose its membership
appeals in all the major energy and tele-
phone utilities billing envelopes. The
cumulative returns drew 48,000 mem-
bers to CUB in its first year. It quickly
grew to a membership of 64,000 the next
year. At CUB's peak of approximately
100,000 members, its membership
encompassed 5% of Wisconsin's total
households. CUB's minimum member-
ship was set at $3 by statute. However,
the average donation was closer to $10.
CUB's annual budget was $700,000
when membership was at its highest level.
Enclosures Today:
Illinois' Experience
Return rates for Illinois CUB utility
bill enclosures from 1984 to 1986 were
similar to Wisconsin's. CUB member-
ship grew quickly, from 50,000 the first
year it inserted messages in utility bills
to a high of 200,000, approximately 4%
of Illinois utility households. Like Wis-
consin, Illinois CUB could enclose its
mailers in all the major utilities' bills.
And like Wisconsin and UCAN, mem-
bership returns leveled off at about
0.5%.
When bill insert privileges were cur-
tailed after both the U.S. Supreme Court
7
and an Illinois U.S. District Court 8 ruled
that CUB enclosures violated utilities'
free speech rights, Illinois CUB mem-
bership and its budget both plummeted.
CUB lost one-fourth of its 170,000
members in the following year. It no
longer had the ability to replace the
members lost through attrition with new-
comers who in previous years had joined
CUB after receiving its mailers in utility
bills. As a consequence, CUB faced a
serious budget deficit in 1987.
CUB supporters drafted legislation in
1987 to amend the 1983 statute and
allow CUB to enclose messages in mass
mailings of state agencies that reach over
50,000 Illinois residents.9 The legisla-
tion was drafted by Steven Pflaum, who
served as one of CUB's attorneys in the
Central Illinois Light case. With suc-
cessful passage of the amendment (the
legislature overrode Governor Jim
Thompson's veto), CUB was able to
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continue to reach a majority of Illinois
households with its membership appeals.
It retained an inexpensive means of
communicating with ratepayers, while at
the same time ensuring that, unlike
"junk" mail, CUB membership appeals
would reach ratepayers in envelopes that
would be opened.
CUB chose to insert its messages in
two state agencies' mailings-motor
vehicle registrations and income tax
refunds. Vehicle registrations are mailed
to approximately 7.5 million car owners
per year, while income tax refunds are
mailed to 2.5 million individuals annual-
ly, for a rough total of ten million inserts
per year.
CUB chose these two agencies for
specific reasons. Everyone who owns a
car receives a vehicle registration once a
year. According to CUB associate direc-
tor Martin Cohen, "If you own a car, you
probably tend to be a utility bill payer,
and you might even tend to have the
resources to make a contribution. We've
made an assumption about people who
own cars. ' 10 CUB also chose income tax
refunds "for obvious reasons," states
Cohen. "People would have a little mon-
ey in their pocket, and they tend to be
heads of households who might be utili-
ty bill payers."
On the other hand, CUB decided not
to use driver's license mailings because
they are mailed only once every four
years. Many who receive them are not
car owners; nor are they necessarily
heads of households since there are usu-
ally multiple drivers per household.
Fishing and hunting licenses were also
not chosen because they do not necessar-
ily target utility bill payers or individuals
who would be likely to support CUB.
The return rate for state agency
inserts compares favorably to the returns
from utility bill envelopes. Cohen states
that the percentage varies from mailing
to mailing, but generally falls between
one-quarter and one-half percent, aver-
aging about 4,000 new members per
month. While this rate of return would
be unacceptable in the world of targeted
direct mail, Cohen points out that for
nontargeted, "scattershot" mailings, one-
half percent is a respectable return.
The number of new members drawn
by state agency inserts keeps CUB's
budget on an even keel by making up for
those members who do not renew each
year. CUB's annual renewal rate is 60-
70%, which, according to Cohen, is
"very good. It's a fairly high number
because it is inexpensive to support
CUB. And we have a high profile."
Explains Cohen, "We are reliant on
the state inserts to maintain our member-
ship base, and we don't need a very large
rate of return to make the payoff." Fur-
thermore, agency mailings are invalu-
able because they allow CUB to
maintain a low membership fee. "We
are, I think, unique in the mail-reliant
end of the nonprofit world in that our
average contribution is ten bucks," states
Cohen. "I don't know who could possi-
bly survive on that small a contribution
without a program that allows you to get
to people very cheaply. State agency
mailings are the reason we're still here."
The "tone" for agency mailings dif-
fers considerably from the pre-1986 util-
ity bill inserts. Because CUB enclosures
are no longer read in conjunction with
the utility bill, the text is not able to
make direct references to the bill itself.
According to executive director Susan
Stewart, the wording of state agency
inserts is considerably more conserva-
tive. "It's the difference between night
and day." I I
A pre-1986 utility bill insert
exclaimed in bold headlines, "This elec-
tric bill is TOO HIGH. What the utilities
have done to your electric bill isn't just
unfair, IT'S UNBELIEVABLE!" Anoth-
er showed a boxing glove jumping out of
a utility bill and flattening the cus-
tomer's nose. It asked, "Is this how you
feel when your utility bill arrives? Now
you can fight back. You can join CUB, a
powerful new citizens organization that
won't take rate increases lying down."
In contrast, an insert prepared for
state agency mailings in 1990 shows a
photograph of stacks of one hundred dol-
lar bills with the headline, "In 1988 and
1989, the utility companies spent more
than $38 million to raise your rates." The
next panel shows a ten dollar check writ-
ten to CUB with the headline above it,
"Here's all it takes to fight back." The
inside of the mailer explains what CUB
is and how it has fought for fair utility
rates. Another recent mailer lists two
ways to cut utility bills: "(1) Join
200,000 Illinois consumers who oppose
higher utility rates and...(2) Receive a
home energy saver kitfree."
Despite the more reserved messages,
the mailers are still colorful and eye-
catching, highlighted with bold displays
of dramatic headlines. According to
Cohen, they are designed so the recipi-
ents of the envelopes are unlikely to
throw CUB's message away without first
looking at it.
Cohen reports that the state agencies
whose envelopes carry the flyers have
been very cooperative with CUB. The
enclosures are easily handled by existing
machinery and have caused virtually no
extra work for state agency staffs. The
CUB office has, however, received com-
plaints from some recipients who won-
der what gives CUB the right to put the
enclosure in their income tax refunds.
Cohen explains to such critics that the
enclosures have been approved by state
law and that they can contact their legis-
lator if they disapprove. CUB has even
received a protest in the form of an
eleven-pound lead plate with CUB's
business-reply postage-paid address
pasted onto it. "Believe it or not, the post
office delivered it to us and charged us
twenty dollars' postage," said Cohen.
Like the pre-1986 inserts, the text for
state agency mailings must be approved
by the Illinois Commerce Commission
(ICC). CUB must adhere to the standard
of presenting information that is "not
false or misleading."'2 CUB works
closely with ICC staff during the text
approval process, answering questions
about the text and if necessary revising
it. To date, staff have not rejected any
CUB enclosures and have passed them
on to the ICC commissioners with the
recommendation to approve the content.
On two occasions, according to Cohen,
commissioners have objected to the con-
tent, the most recent instance being a
concern that a statement about high elec-
tricity rates might be bad for Illinois'
business climate. In both cases, however,
the ICC voted to approve the enclosure
texts on the basis that the wording met
the criteria of being neither false nor
misleading.
Supplemental Funding Methods
CUB leaders are the first to acknowl-
edge that enclosures in mass mailings,
whether utility bills or state agency mail-
ings, are not the answer to funding their
operations. While enclosures provide an
inexpensive means to reach ratepayers,
CUBs must supplement this method with
other fundraising schemes, especially
after the first two or three years of use.
Illinois CUB director Susan Stewart
emphasizes, "If an organization tries to
survive strictly on the state mailings as a
source of funds, they are doomed to fail-
ure. At some point, they are not even
going to be close. ' 13 She adds, "The pur-
pose of that enclosure is not to raise
money to run the organization. The pur-
pose is really to give us a list of names of
people who are interested in becoming
active members in the organization and
donating additional funds."
Stewart's words are echoed by other
CUB leaders. Referring to the pre-1986
utility bill enclosures, UCAN executive
director Michael Shames notes, "I don't
think enclosures are an outstanding
fundraising vehicle, but they do have the
benefit of getting your name in front of
lots of people."14 Former Wisconsin
CUB director Kathleen O'Reilly takes a
similar tack. "Enclosures should only be
seen as a vehicle to getting on the map.
Even though they give you access to all
those people, enclosures should only be
seen as a start-up fundraising vehicle."
' 15




At the same time, CUB leaders stress
the importance of enclosures as an
extremely effective means to quickly
raise start-up funds and develop a sub-
stantial membership base. In the long
run, enclosures allow CUBs to continue
to draw enough new members to com-
pensate for those who do not renew their
memberships. Robert Fellmeth, a
founder of UCAN, emphasizes, "They
give you entry, a stake. And they have
importance beyond the 'kick-start.' Lat-
er years may see a declining rate of
response, but inserts can still provide a
vehicle for expanding the [membership]
base to compensate for nonrenewals.
Further, the written message on a policy
issue or information on a CUB victory
helps build name recognition and famil-
iarity with utility issues-and to some
extent even enhances loyalty to the
CUB. Perhaps the number of inserts
should decline after the first year, but
ideally they should not stop."'
16
Methods used by CUBs to raise addi-
tional funds in order to supplement
enclosure revenues have included door-
to-door canvassing and direct mail
appeals. Both the Wisconsin CUB and
UCAN discontinued canvassing because
of high overhead costs and difficulty in
finding reliable canvassers. But all
CUBs have continued to use direct mail
appeals, at the very least, to contact
existing and past members for renewals
and supplemental contributions.
The Illinois CUB uses the services of
a direct mail firm and tests a variety of
lists for targeted mailings. It has found
that its message does well with what
associate director Cohen calls "very
strange bedfellows"-mailing lists on
the political left as well as on the right.
"People who are donors for any kind of
causes tend to be sympathetic with what
we are doing." CUB targets about one-
half million membership appeals a year.
It does not conduct direct mail prospect-
ing campaigns unless it is certain it can
at least break even on costs by obtaining
at minimum a 2% return.
The Illinois CUB is somewhat
restricted in the number of lists it can use
because it will not trade its own list.
According to Cohen, "There are many
good lists out there that are only avail-
able in trade. They want your list if you
get theirs for testing purposes." CUB
does not trade its lists for "free" access
to another organization's list because of
its strict policy of protecting the privacy
of its members.
CUBs have generally not found
grants from charitable or corporate foun-
dations to be a realistic or reliable source
of supplemental funding. While a
fledgling CUB may be successful in
obtaining grant funding, this option is
not considered to be a source of ongoing
support because of many foundations'
preference to award only "seed" grants.
In addition, CUBs' advocacy stance
rules out awards from many foundations.
The Wisconsin CUB, for example, found
that its requests for grant funds were
thwarted by foundation board members
who represented the energy and tele-
phone utilities in the state.
17
The Oregon CUB, on the other hand,
actively seeks grant funds for specific
consumer education and research pro-
jects rather than to fund its participation
in utility proceedings. According to
executive director Kimberly Moore
Webster, CUB's current grant-seeking
activities focus on funding for renewable
energy resources projects. 18
In summary, supplemental funding is
necessary to shore up the revenue
obtained from enclosures included in
mass mailings. Reliance on enclosures
alone will only support a CUB for the
first year or two. Thereafter, the CUB
must be in constant pursuit of other rev-
enue sources to supplement enclosure
income. In order to raise sufficient funds
to support the organization over the long
term, Illinois CUB director Susan Stew-
art recommends that CUBs establish "a
good fundraising plan from the very start
with whatever tools are available to
them."19
Other Bill Insert Options
While Illinois' response to the loss of
utility bill enclosure privileges was to
pass legislation allowing CUB access to
state agency mailings, California took a
different approach. The California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission (PUC) explored
ways to continue to use the extra space
in utility bills to further its goal of stimu-
lating residential ratepayer participation
in PUC proceedings. It sought enclosure
uses which would pass constitutional
muster in light of the PG&E case. In
1986 it considered several proposals to
encourage the participation of organiza-
tions which represent residential rate-
payer interests:
- Place PUC legal notices in utility
billing envelopes informing ratepayers
of the opportunity to support groups
which represent their interests in PUC
proceedings.
- Allow utility companies to enclose
such materials as newsletters and com-
mercial advertisements only if the utility
reimburses ratepayers for the value of
the insert space.
- Use the extra space for commercial
advertising and apply the revenues to
reduce utility rates.
- Earmark a portion of utility compa-
ny and commercial advertising revenues
generated by billing envelopes to pro-
vide up-front funding for consumer
groups that are financially incapable of
fully participating in PUC proceed-
ings.
20
In May 1987 the California PUC
established the Ratepayer Notice Pro-
gram (RNP), which it believed to be the
least intrusive of the options and the
most likely to avoid the first amendment
issue addressed in the 1986 Supreme
Court opinion in PG&E v. PUC. The
PUC ordered regulated utilities to
include "legal notice" inserts informing
utility customers of the existence of vari-
ous consumer groups (called inter-
venors) that represent residential
ratepayers in rate proceedings.21 Rather
than listing these groups on the insert,
the PUC decided to serve as a clearing-
house for this information. It directed
ratepayers to write to the PUC for the
list, thereby avoiding the constitutional
question raised by requiring the utility to
-carry the message of a third party.
The PUC's notices were included in
utility bill inserts from September 1987
to February 1989. A large-print headline
announced, "Here's how you can have
your say about the price you pay for gas
and electricity." The text informed the
reader about the existence of intervenors
and how to write to the PUC to request
the list. It also explained how ratepayers
can participate directly in PUC proceed-
ings.
In all, 54,000 people contacted the
Public Advisor's Office of the PUC to
obtain the list of intervenors.22 The list
included UCAN as well as nearly two
dozen other organizations in California
that regularly or occasionally participate
in PUC ratemaking proceedings on
behalf of a variety of ratepayer interests.
Despite the number of inquiries for the
PUC's list, however, very few of the
ratepayers who received the list actually
contacted the intervenors directly in
order to support their work with dona-
tions or membership contributions.
UCAN reported that out of 400 San
Diego Gas and Electric Company cus-
tomers who requested the list, only three
contacted UCAN. Michael Shames con-
trasted that with the 70,000 who joined
UCAN in response to inserts in
SDG&E's monthly bills. After 18
months, the Ratepayer Notice Program
was deemed a failure by the PUC and
was discontinued in 1989.23 It did not
achieve the goal of increasing residential
ratepayer participation in PUC proceed-
ings through support of intervenor
groups.
In October 1990 the PUC issued an
Order Instituting Investigation (011) to
explore other ways to use the extra space
in utility bills to increase residential
ratepayer paicipation in regulatory pro-
ceedings.24 Among the alternatives that
utilities and intervenor groups have been
asked to discuss are these:
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- The status quo position: Rely on the
existing support mechanism provided by
the PUC's intervenor compensation pro-
gram and its Public Advisor's Office; do
not establish any kind of bill insert pro-
gram.
- Continue the Ratepayer Notice Pro-
gram in which ratepayers write to the
PUC for a list of intervenors.
- Provide a PUC-sponsored bill insert
which describes the intervenors and lists
their addresses.
. Use state agency mass mailings to
carry messages either from the PUC
Public Advisor's Office or the inter-
venors themselves.
- Charge utilities for their use of the
empty space and use the funds to support
independent mailings to utility cus-
tomers of intervenor information; or
require utilities to sell the extra space to
commercial advertisers and use the rev-
enues to fund intervenor programs.
In formal responses to the 011, the
utilities have objected to all uses of the
bill envelopes except he Ratepayer
Notice Program. They argue that provid-
ing a list of the names and addresses of
intervenors would violate their first
amendment rights as recognized by the
plurality inPG&E v. PUC, because it
would force them to associate with mes-
sages with which they disagree. Because
the intervenors identified on the notice
are likely to advocate in opposition to
the utilities, the utilities argue that the
notice would not be content-neutral.
The utilities also object to any pro-
gram which would directly or indirectly
solicit financial support for inter-
venors-for example, selling the extra
space to commercial advertisers or to the
utilities themselves. They contend that
this too would violate their free speech
rights by indirectly forcing utilities to
finance the informational dissemination
of opposing groups.
On the other hand, the public interest
organizations which responded to the
01125 do not believe that a notice con-
taining the names and addresses of con-
sumer groups would violate utilities'
free speech rights. They claim that such
a PUC-sponsored notice would be nei-
ther ideologically based nor advocacy in
nature. Rather, it would notify ratepayers
of available entities representing their
interests. Intervenors also favor the sale
of the extra space for the benefit of
groups that represent residential ratepay-
ers in PUC proceedings. They
recommend that the proceeds could fund
both independent mailings containing
intervenor information as well as a com-
pensation program that would provide
up-front financial support for inter-
venors who participate in PUC proceed-
ings. At this writing, the PUC had not
yet issued a ruling on further procedures
to be followed in the investigation.
Intervenor Compensation
for CU s
The many advantages of enclosures
in mass mailings have been discussed in
Part I of this article.26  However,
fundraising via the vehicle of inserts in
mass mailings is not the whole story.
The legislative climate in many states
may not be conducive to passing a bill
establishing a CUB and authorizing it to
enclose its messages in state agency
mailings. Even in states that may pass
CUB legislation, the amount of money
obtained through enclosures cannot be
expected to be sufficient to fund a viable
organization over the long term. And if
the state's population is small, revenue
from enclosure returns may never be suf-
ficient to comprise the total annual oper-
ating budget unless, like UCAN's expe-
rience, the CUB receives phenomenal
public support.
Although not central to the CUB con-
cept as originally conceived, intervenor
compensation deserves some discussion
here as a supplemental source of revenue
to support CUB advocacy. But first, a
brief digression is in order to place inter-
venor compensation in context with oth-
er methods of encouraging ratepayer
representation.
Background. The value of represent-
ing diverse points of view in utility regu-
latory proceedings has been acknowl-
edged in a number of different ways by
state governments. Most states have
established some form of ratepayer rep-
resentation as an arm of govern-
ment-an office of consumer counsel, a
division of the attorney general's office
charged with representing utility
ratepayers or a department within the
commission itself.27 But such offices
often face staffing and budget con-
straints and, more significantly, political
pressures that limit the number and kinds
of cases they can pursue.
Regulatory commissions and state
legislatures in a handful of states have
established compensation programs for
nongovernment intervenors and con-
sumer groups that represent the interests
of residential ratepayers in regulatory
proceedings.28 Although intervenor
compensation programs operate differ-
ently in each state, their overall purpose
is to bring the viewpoints of traditionally
underrepresented groups into regulatory
proceedings in order to balance the
information provided by the utilities on
behalf of their stockholders.
The precedent for intervenor com-
pensation programs was established in
1978 by the federal Public Utilities Reg-
ulatory Policies Act (PURPA).29 It
requires that electric utilities involved in
PURPA proceedings compensate indi-
viduals or groups who make a substan-
tial contribution to the proceedings for
"reasonable attorneys' fees, expert wit-
ness fees, and other reasonable costs."
PURPA waives the requirement if the
state provides an "alternative means for
assuring representation of electric con-
sumers."30 The act also authorized fund-
ing for grants to state consumer counsel
offices to assist consumers in participat-
ing in the development of innovative rate
structures to encourage energy conserva-
tion.
California's Intervenor Compensa-
tion Program. In California the concept
that consumer participation in utility
proceedings is an "inherent good" that
deserves to be nurtured by the state was
established in a landmark 1979 Califor-
nia Supreme Court case, Consumers
Lobby Against Monopolies (CLAM) v.
Public Utilities Commission.3 1 The court
held that the PUC has jurisdiction in cer-
tain cases to award attorneys' fees and
related costs to consumers who have
made a substantial contribution to the
outcome of the case.
As a result of the CLAM case, the
PUC established the Advocates Trust
Fund in 1981 to defray the expenses of
intervenors where no other means of
funding is available. In 1983 the PUC
adopted rules to award compensation to
individuals or groups for "reasonable"
fees associated with their "intervention
in any hearing or proceeding of the com-
mission for the purpose of modifying a
rate or establishing a fact or rule that
may influence a rate."32 When several
utility companies challenged the PUC's
authority to award intervenor fees, the
legislature passed a bill which expressly
authorized the PUC to do so.33 Inter-
venor awards for a particular proceeding
are assessed against the relevant utility,
which passes that cost on to ratepayers in
its rate structure.
The California intervenor compensa-
tion program is administered by the PUC
Public Advisor's Office. A consumer
group must file an application for a
"finding of eligibility" in order to be
considered for compensation in an
upcoming proceeding. If it meets the
PUC's qualifications-that is, shows
that it represents an interest not other-
wise represented and demonstrates
financial hardship--it is generally grant-
ed eligibility to participate in a proceed-
ing.
When the proceeding is completed
and the PUC's final order has been giv-
en, the intervenor may apply for com-
pensation. The consumer group must
prove that it has made a "substantial con-
tribution," such that the PUC's final
order adopts at least one of the inter-
venor's "factual contentions, legal con-
tentions, or specific policy or procedural
recommendations."34 The intervenor
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must also show that its contribution did
not duplicate the contribution of any oth-
er party.
While the PUC's compensation pro-
gram has encouraged the participation of
California consumer groups in its pro-
ceedings, many critics contend that the
system is seriously flawed. The inter-
venor is not eligible to receive an award
until after the proceeding is completed.
It must fund its participation with its
own scarce resources for the many
months, and sometimes years, that the
proceeding is in progress. Even when
completed, the PUC often delays the
award for many months or years more
while it deliberates on the value of the
intervenor's contribution to the proceed-
ing.
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Intervenors are critical not only of the
delays, but also of the way in which their
contributions to proceedings are
assessed. That a contribution is benefi-
cial to the overall give-and-take of the
proceeding is of no significance if that
contribution is not expressly recognized
in the PUC's final order. Intervenors also
charge that the awards are generally one-
half or less of what they have expended.
If, for example, five major contentions
are advanced by the intervenor and two
are adopted with substantial ratepayer
savings, the PUC will commonly award
only 40% of the requested costs and
expenses.36 However, utilities are able to
assess ratepayers for the full costs of
their legal advocacy.
In contrast, attorneys' fees under the"private attorney general" doctrine in
court proceedings are awarded in full if
any significant contributions are made,
and there is often a "multiplier" above
market levels where risk is taken by the
prevailing party.37 The PUC's use of a
"divider" rather than a multiplier means
the intervenor's participation in regula-
tory proceedings is undercompensated
vis-a-vis participation in civil litigation
or in other fee-generating activities.38
The cumulative impact of the program's
roadblocks is that only a few intervenors
participate in regulatory proceedings on
a consistent basis. In fact, one inter-
venor, TURN, has received half of all
awards, according to PUC records.39
Intervenor Compensation in Wis-
consin. The Wisconsin intervenor com-
pensation program, unlike the California
system, awards compensation to partici-
pants during the course of the proceed-
ing. The fund, administered by the PSC,
has been available since 1983. CUB and
a handful of other citizens groups have
received compensation for their advoca-
cy before the Commission.
An organization which plans to par-
ticipate in a PSC proceeding files an
application which estimates its total bud-
get for legal and other consulting
expenses. When the application is
approved by the PSC, it establishes a
contract with the organization via a pur-
chase order. Program administrator Gor-
don Grant explains that groups can then
submit invoices for their advocacy
expenses throughout the proceeding.
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Payments are made approximately 30
days from the date of the invoice, and
approximately 90% of all invoices are
approved.
The minimum annual amount set by
the legislature for the fund is $200,000,
although, according to Grant, the total
applications by Wisconsin citizens
groups have yet to exceed this amount. If
applications were to exhaust the
$200,000 fund, the legislature has estab-
lished a process whereby additional
funds could be awarded. In addition, if
an individual applicant exceeds its
requested amount, it can submit an
amended application at any time during
the proceeding.
CUB and the Wisconsin Environmen-
tal Decade are the predominant appli-
cants for intervenor compensation. Grant
explains that some "home-grown"
groups which are organized around spe-
cific issues have also applied for funds.
Examples are Power Incorporated, con-
cerned about stray voltage from high-
power transmission lines, and the South-
east Property Owners Association,
which has opposed a pipeline extension.
Grant states that although the pro-
gram has its limitations, it has improved
the regulatory process by allowing inter-
venors to participate in PSC proceed-
ings. "Sometimes just knowing that a
body [an intervenor] is out there causes a
reversal of action [by the utility],"
explains Grant. "For example, when
CUB intervened in a Wisconsin Gas
case, this caused the utility to reconsider
the case."
The major drawback of the program
is that intervenors cannot use funds for
internal organizational expenses, like
employee salaries and office overhead.
Guidelines specify that funds are
restricted to hiring outside expertise.
Wisconsin CUB director Christopher
Blythe explains that "you need that kind
of program to be effective and compete
on a level playing field [with the utili-
ties]. But at the same time, it doesn't
provide CUB with any kind of direct
financial support." According to Blythe,
the current guidelines do not provide
organizational stability to groups like
CUB. During times when membership is
low and revenue has declined, a skeletal
staff working with limited funds is hard-
pressed to take an active role in PSC pro-
ceedings at the same time that it con-
ducts an ambitious fundraising
campaign. "If you get an intervenor
compensation grant to hire outside
expertise, it almost works against you,"
states Blythe. "You spend a lot of time
on the rate case to the exclusion to
fundraising, when you really need to be
doing both."4 1
At this writing, the PSC has con-
vened a task force of Commission staff
and intervenor representatives to review
the guidelines of the compensation pro-
gram. CUB and other intervenor groups
have recommended that they be allowed
to fund internal operations with program
funds.
Michigan's Grant Program. The
Michigan Utility Consumer Representa-
tion Fund embodies what political scien-
tist William Gormley considers to be an
"ideal" intervenor compensation pro-
gram.42 Compensation is awarded up
front in the form of grants. Intervenors
are not required to prove after the fact
that they made substantial or unique con-
tributions to the proceeding. The grant
process encourages the participation of
many intervenors, at least in theory, in
order to bring different types of ratepay-
er interests before the state's Public Ser-
vice Commission.
Once a year intervenors submit grant
proposals to the Utility Consumer Partic-
ipation Board in which they project their
activities and expenses for the coming
year. The five-member board, estab-
lished by the legislature in 1982, is
appointed by the governor and adminis-
tered by the Department of Management
and Budget, an executive branch
agency. 43
Utilities fund the program with a
combined annual assessment of approxi-
mately $600,000. One-half of that
amount is appropriated to the Attorney
General's Office for ratepayer represen-
tation. The remaining $300,000 is
awarded to intervenors who apply for the
funds.
Although the competitive grant pro-
cess is meant to encourage several inter-
venors to participate in regulatory pro-
ceedings, in practice only two
organizations have consistently applied
for the funds. The Residential Ratepayer
Consortium is comprised of a dozen
public interest groups, including the
Michigan Citizens Lobby and the Amer-
ican Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), who have joined forces to hire
attorneys and consultants to represent
their interests. The Michigan Com-
munity Action Agency Association
(MCAAA) represents community action
programs on behalf of low-income
ratepayers. Both organizations work
closely with the Attorney General's
Office to coordinate the hiring of expert
witnesses and to divide the workload
between them in order to avoid duplica-
tive expenses.





Michigan's grant program offers sev-
eral advantages over intervenor compen-
sation programs in other states. Funds
are awarded prior to an organization's
participation in a proceeding, allowing it
to plan its level of involvement accord-
ingly. And the program is administered
by an office of the executive branch of
government, not the Public Service
Commission.
Nonetheless, the program is limited
in scope and funding. Advocacy is
restricted to energy utilities only, not to
telephone regulation. The program does
not support legislative advocacy. In
addition, the grant amounts received by
each intervenor are relatively small. If
the intervenors were to participate in all
cases considered by the Public Service
Commission, they would only be able to
receive about $30,000 for each case per
year.
Model Intervenor Compensation
Program. The shortcomings of existing
intervenor compensation programs
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suggest a model for an "ideal" system.
In short, the model program, as outlined
below,45 promotes two goals: (1) partici-
pation by intervenors who represent a
variety of consumers' interests; and (2)
minimum barriers to participation for
qualified intervenors:
- Some funds are awarded to quali-
fied intervenors while the proceeding is
in progress, rather than a system which
compensates intervenors only after the
fact. Final awards which fully compen-
sate the intervenor (at market rates) for
the time expended are made, and funds
are provided within 90 days of the com-
mission's final ruling. Interest on the
award accrues from the date of the com-
mission's decision.
- Awards are based on an intervenor's
contribution whether or not the sub-
stance of that contribution is adopted
entirely in the final decision. The inter-
venor is not required to have contributed
to the specific arguments cited by the
commission in its final opinion in order
to receive compensation, so long as the
intervenor made a material contribution
to the outcome or to the process.
- Intervenors are not penalized for
presenting information which duplicates
the contribution of others so long as it
beneficially contributes to the outcome
and is not copied from any other source.
A "nonduplication" standard only serves
to discourage intervenors from sharing
information and working cooperatively
with each other and with commission
staff.
. Criteria for qualification are clearly
defined. Intervenors apply for eligibility
for the first case in which they partici-
pate. In additional cases, eligibility is
assumed. Repetitive eligibility filings
are not required. The qualification pro-
cess eliminates intervenors who may not
be qualified to participate or whose par-
ticipation may be trivial or lacking in
substance.
- Intervenors are compensated for
their full participation at reasonable and
full market rates. They are eligible for
multipliers analogous to "private attor-
ney general" enhancement awards.
- The program is adequately funded
through utility assessments or legislative
appropriation to support active participa-
tion by a number of intervenors.
- The process by which awards are
granted is insulated from pressures
exerted by commissioners, political par-
ties and special interests in order to
avoid situations in which intervenors are
prevented from receiving awards
because their particular positions are at
odds with individuals and/or political
parties in power. Ideally, the intervenor
compensation program is administered
by an agency other than the public utili-
ties commission.
Applicability for CUB Funding.
Intervenor compensation programs, at
least those which approach the "ideal"
model suggested above, hold the
promise of providing a modicum of bud-
getary stability for CUBs in at least two
scenarios-states with small populations
where state agency mailing inserts
would draw insufficient revenue, and
states which do not pass legislation
authorizing a CUB's access to state
agency mass mailings.
In this discussion, we assume that a
viable CUB requires an annual operating
budget of at least $250,000 to $500,000.
The lower amount would allow for the
establishment of an office and payment
of overhead costs associated with its
maintenance, the salaries for a full-time
staff of one or two professionals and
minimum support staff, the expenses
associated with communications such as
newsletters and membership mailings,
and some funds to support advocacy.
The higher amount would support some-
what more active participation in regula-
tory proceedings.
The costs of participating in rate cas-
es tend to vary little whether a CUB is in
a small or large state, whether the case
involves a small utility or a large one.
When considering the need for expert
witnesses and specialized legal exper-
tise, the expenses of participating in reg-
ulatory proceedings can amount to as
much as $100,000 per case. As such,
intervenor compensation would be of
particular value for CUBs in smaller
states. States with populations under two
million 46 would not have a sufficient
population base to attract enough mem-
bers through inserts in state agency mail-
ings to fund a substantial portion of the
organization's budget past the first two
or three years of usage.
As Table 1 below illustrates, a state
such as Oregon with a population of
nearly three million could expect about
$100,000 per year in revenue from mem-
bership donations obtained via state
agency mass mailings, and another
$240,000 from renewals. To reach an
annual budget of $500,000, the CUB
would need additional revenue of
$160,000. This could be obtained in part
through direct mail campaigns, door-to-
door canvassing and appeals to existing
members for supplementary contribu-
tions. However, these methods are costly
and not always reliable. Payment of
CUB for its participation in regulatory
proceedings through an intervenor com-
pensation program would not only sup-
plement the budget but also provide a
source of income that could be relied
upon from year to year to support the
organization's advocacy. If the inter-
venor compensation program were the
"ideal" model as recommended above, it
would serve to stabilize the organization
even when its membership base decreas-
es, as often happens in citizens groups
on a cyclical basis.
Another scenario in which intervenor
compensation would play a vital funding
role is in states where CUBs are estab-
lished without the benefit of state agency
mass mailings as the vehicle for solicit-
ing members. In such a situation, a pro-
gram of intervenor compensation is vir-
tually a necessity to fund CUB's
participation in regulatory proceedings.
Indeed, since the loss of the utility bill
enclosure privilege, the Wisconsin CUB
and UCAN in San Diego have both
obtained a portion of their funding from
the compensation programs of their
respective regulatory commissions.
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When discussing intervenor compen-
sation as a source of funding for CUBs,
it is important that the mission of CUBs
not be forgotten. CUBs are by definition
membership-based grassroots organiza-
tions, representative of and answerable
to the members. This report does not
suggest that intervenor compensation be
viewed as the sole or even primary
source of revenue for CUBs, thereby
overtaking membership contributions as
the funding base. However, the impor-
tance of intervenor compensation as a
stabilizing source of revenue should not
be overlooked-to enable the organiza-
tion to continue its advocacy work when
membership-based revenues reach a
plateau or decline.
In summary, an effective intervenor
compensation program can be the differ-
ence between a viable organization, one
that aggressively represents residential
ratepayers in a broad range of utility pro-
ceedings, and an organization that can
participate only minimally and intermit-
tently in utility proceedings. With the
availability of adequate compensation
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for participation in regulatory proceed- funding options. As such, it is meant to Some words of caution are in order.
ings, a CUB can conceivably afford to serve only as a framework for considera- The table is based loosely on actual
develop full-time expertise within the tion by those who may be planning to membership patterns of the four existing
organization rather than relying on out- establish a CUB. CUBs. Since the Illinois CUB is the only
side consultants who are hired for spe- A careful analysis of the hypothetical one so far to insert its membership
cific cases. In-house expertise would situations illustrated in Table I demon- appeals in state agency mailings, the
enable the CUB to develop continuity strates the importance of having either membership and budget estimates
from one case to another, much like the state agency mass mailing privileges or extrapolated for the other states can only
legal staffs maintained by the utilities, intervenor compensation in order to be seen for what they are--estimates.
albeit on a considerably smaller scale, maintain the CUB organization at a Best-case scenarios have generally
Intervenor compensation would be of viable level of operation. However, rely- been used to derive the table's estimates.
particular value to CUBs that do not ing on intervenor compensation to stabi- For example, the return rate for state
have access to mass mailings as well as lize the budget does nothing to maintain agency inserts is figured at 0.5%, where-
CUBs in smaller states where revenue the membership base from year to year. as in practice, the Illinois CUB has
from agency mailings would not be suf- If a CUB were to receive a substantial found that returns fluctuate from 0.3% to
ficient to support CUB operations. portion of its budget from intervenor 0.5%. The expected membership range
The CUB Funding Mix: compensation and did not have state of 3-5% of ratepayer households may be
A Summary agency mailing privileges, it would need somewhat underinflated, however, there-to increase its supplemental fundraising by offsetting the higher return rate fig-
Table 1 summarizes this section's efforts in future years-such as direct ures. Actual memberships for the Wis-
analysis of the various fundraising mail appeals and canvassing-in order consin and UCAN CUBs at their heights
schemes available to CUBs. It is, by to replenish the members lost each year exceeded the projections offered in
necessity, an oversimplification of the through attrition. Table 1.
Table 1
CUB Membership and Funding Expectations for Different Population Bases
Table la: Hypothetical Membership Expectations
Large State Medium State Small State or Large Locality
Model Illinois CUB Wisconsin CUB Oregon CUB / UCAN
Population (1989 estim.) 11.7 million 4.9 million 2.8 million / 2.3 million
No. of households (2.6 persons per HH) 4.5 million 1.9 million 1.1 million / 900,000
Expected membership range @ 3-5% of HH 135,000-225,000 57,000-95,000 30,000-50,000
Source of members:
a) State agency inserts 50,000 20,000 10,000
@ 0.5% response rate (from 10 million pieces) (from 4 million pieces) (from 2 million pieces)
b) Membership renewals 96,000 45,600 24,000
@ 60% renewal rate (from 160,000 members) (from 76,000 members) (from 40,000 members)
c) Direct mail, canvassing, fairs, etc. 14,000 10,400 6,000
Total members * 160,000 76,000 40,000
Table 1b: Hypothetical Funding Expectations
Annual Revenue Sources Large State Medium State Small State or Large Locality
a) State agency inserts @ 0.5% $500,000 $200,000 $100,000
response rate, $10 contribution (from 10 million pieces) (from 4 million pieces) (from 2 million pieces)
b) Membership renewals @ 60% $960,000 $456,000 $240,000
renewal rate, $10 contribution (from 160,000 members) (from 76,000 members) (from 40,000 members)
c) Direct mail, canvassing, fairs, etc. $140,000 $104,000 $60,000
d) Intervenor compensation $200,000 $150,000 $100,000
Total a, b, c * $1.6 million $760,000 $400,000
Total b, c, d * $1.3 million $710,000 $400,000
Total a, b, c, d $$ $1.8 million $864,000 $500,000
Notes to Table 1:
• Actual memberships and budgets for existing CUBs, at their highest, are as follows: Illinois - 200,000 members, $1.7 million budget;
Wisconsin - 100,000 members, $700,000 budget UCAN - 70,000 members, $340,000 budget; Oregon - 20,000 members, $250,000
budget (without enclosure privileges).
•* These budget totals assume that the CUB is 100% funded by memberships at an average annual contribution of $10.
Without state agency mailing access, the CUB would have to drastically increase its supplemental fundraising efforts (such as direct
mail) and/or increase the minimum requirement for membership contribution in order to maintain this budget level in further years.
: A state which provides state agency insert privileges may not be likely to have an intervenor compensation program and vice versa
However, this scenario does how how CUBs, especially those in states with small populations, could benefit from both.
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 19'
FEATURE ARTICLE
STRUCTURAL ISSUES
Architects are well-grounded in the
meaning of the old adage, "form follows
function." The early organizational
architects of CUBs likewise proposed a
structure that would support the mission
of CUBs. They designed both a funding
mechanism and a form of governance
that would best ensure that CUBs effec-
tively represent and are accountable to
residential ratepayers.
The funding mechanism-inserting
CUB messages in mass mailings of utili-
ties, and more recently, state agen-
cies-not only allows CUBs to reach a
majority of ratepayers, but also gives
CUBs an inexpensive means to draw
members from a broad spectrum of the
population. The form of gover-
nance-democratic elections of repre-
sentatives to a board of directors-pro-
vides a strong measure of accountability
by ensuring that CUBs remain respon-
sive to members' concerns.
CUBs are not monolithic institutions,
however. As they have developed, they
have explored alternative structures
from those proposed by the CUB pio-
neers. These variations on the theme
include how best to organize-by utility,
by region, by state-as well as alterna-
tive governance and funding models.
Statewide versus Local Scope
CUBs were originally envisioned as
statewide consumer organizations, rep-
resenting the interests of all residential
ratepayers in the state and covering all
the regulated utilities. In virtually all of
the dozen states that were considering
CUBs prior to the 1986 PG&E v. PUC
decision, consumer activists promoted
legislation based on the single-organiza-
tion statewide model. Three of the' four
existing CUBs-Wisconsin, Illinois and
Oregon-were established through leg-
islation mandating statewide scope.
Only one CUB, UCAN, has pursued the
local model.
The Case for Local CUBs. The for-
mation of UCAN, a local CUB estab-
lished in San Diego in 1983, opened up
the debate regarding which type of orga-
nization best serves ratepayers' inter-
ests-one with a statewide scope or one
which serves the local consumers of one
utility.
The founders of UCAN were strong
proponents of a local approach. Execu-
tive director Michael Shames, who at the
time UCAN was established was a law
student instrumental in creating the
organization, believes a local single-util-
ity CUB can be more responsive to the
ratepayers in the utility service area.
According to Shames, "Ratepayers are
best off having an advocate who is repre-
sentative of a clearly-defined customer
base. While it's important for a utility to
be responsive to its customers, it's just as
important for a utility watchdog to be
responsive to the community. Further,
there is a great deal of institutional
acceptance to having a local watchdog
group."
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Leonard Grimes, president of the
California Public Utilities Commission
at the time UCAN was formed, also
favored local CUBs because of
improved ratepayer representation. "I
think that ratepayers will enjoy better
representation under a utility-specific
approach. A consumer group charged
with statewide ratepayer representation
will have to prioritize and may be forced
to ignore issues which are of vital impor-
tance to ratepayers of smaller utilities. It
might also focus on issues of concern to
urban ratepayers and give insufficient
attention to the needs of those living in
rural areas."
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A second reason some prefer the
local approach is grassroots support.
UCAN founder Robert Fellmet-h of the
Center for Public Interest Law stresses
that "the ratepayer is more likely to
respond to an organization directed nar-
rowly at a particular utility." 50 Grimes
echoed Fellmeth's assertion. "Ratepay-
ers are more likely to support an organi-
zation if they know that organization is
designed to work on matters involving
their utility." 5 1
UCAN's phenomenal membership
growth is testimonial to the benefits of
the local utility-specific structure. In two
years' time, UCAN attracted 8% of San
Diego households, a percentage twice as
high as statewide CUBs in Illinois and
Wisconsin reached. Members have
responded enthusiastically to letter-writ-
ing campaigns and participation in hear-
ings. A hearing in 1988 drew 1,000
members who crowded the meeting
room to express their disapproval of
SDG&E's proposed $4.80 per month flat
fee customer service charge. SDG&E
subsequently withdrew its proposal.
Over 1,600 San Diegans responded to a
UCAN letter-writing campaign in March
1991 to protest the proposed merger of
SDG&E and Los Angeles-based South-
ern California Edison. That merger has
been rejected by the PUC.
Similar issues of representation and
membership support emerged when the
New York Public Service Commission
(PSC) held hearings on the formation of
a CUB in 1984. Those who favored the
development of local utility-specific
CUBs argued that a single statewide
CUB would be an impractical approach
for a state with such a diverse population
and geographic make-up. They asserted
that a single CUB in a state the size of
New York would have difficulty reach-
ing consensus on issues, thereby imped-
ing its effectiveness as a consumer orga-
nization. Further, proponents of local
CUBs felt fundraising would be easier
"since solicitation efforts would be tar-
geted to the consumers served by a par-
ticular utility." 52 They cited as support-
ing evidence UCAN's success in
attracting members.
Supporters of multiple local CUBs
for New York state were not of one mind
as to how they should be structured.
Some favored regional CUBs to repre-
sent the service territories of New York's
major power companies. Others suggest-
ed that CUBs be organized along indus-
try lines, citing the advantage that staff
would be able to develop the expertise
necessary to intervene in proceedings of
the particular industries. A third sugges-
tion was to split the state geographically
and form one all-purpose CUB for
upstate New York and another CUB for
downstate New York.
It is noteworthy that the proponents
of utility-specific CUBs hail from Cali-
fornia and New York-states with large
and diverse populations as well as
marked geographic differences. Despite
the advantages that local and regional
CUBs may offer for large states, some
very practical limitations appear to rule
out their widespread development. The
overriding drawback to local CUBs, and
perhaps the reason there is only one to
date, is resources. Few local CUBs
would be able to attract a sufficient num-
ber of members to sustain a viable long-
term organization. Even Michael
Shames, director of a successful local
CUB, concedes that "without pooling of
resources, it is unlikely for a local group
to effectively take on the utility."
Benefits of a Statewide Organiza-
tion. CUB leaders, both past and present,
concur that economies of scale virtually
demand a statewide approach to structur-
ing CUBs. Susan Stewart, director f the
Illinois CUB, points out that "there are
some economies to be achieved by using
the same witnesses, the same attorneys
and the same arguments in two cases
rather than one. You don't have to rein-
vent the wheel every time you hire a wit-
ness... There are precedents hat get set
in one case, which, if you are a statewide
organization, you know and can apply to
other cases. But if you are operating in
isolation and are not in tune with the
precedents being set in other cases, and
aren't aware of the.nuances and discus-
sions that went on in those cases, you
lose the benefit of that knowledge. It's
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more efficient to run it as a statewide
organization."53
In a similar vein, Tom Lonsway, pres-
ident of the board of directors of the
Wisconsin CUB, states, "Single-utility
CUBs would diffuse the resources. The
issues we tend to pick are the precedent-
setting issues. The utilities may differ
but the issues are the same, like the hold-
ing company issue."54 Former Wiscon-
sin CUB director Kathleen O'Reilly
adds, "To limit your jurisdiction to a
region would be a very limited and false
economy because the expertise you have
to develop is so extensive." 55
Fundraising and membership devel-
opment are perhaps the most compelling
reasons for establishing statewide CUBs.
A statewide organization assures a large
population base from which to solicit
enough members and funds to establish
a viable organization. Issues that a
statewide CUB would encounter would
be more likely to maintain the interest of
a critical mass of members over time
rather than those encountered by a local,
utility-specific CUB. Former Oregon
CUB director Barbara Head explains
that local/regional CUBs would not be
feasible in a state as small as Oregon.
"Regulatory actions take so long that
it would be hard to sustain members'
interest around one utility. By covering
both telecommunications and energy
[statewide], there is always something
happening."
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A statewide CUB also prevents both
the consumer confusion and diffusion of
membership dollars that could occur if
there were more than one CUB to join.
In order to ensure their representation in
all utility matters-telephone, electricity
and gas-consumers are more likely to
join one all-purpose CUB than several
CUBs.
Robert Fellmeth, founder of a suc-
cessful local CUB (UCAN), points out
an additional advantage of a statewide
CUB. "A statewide organization may be
better able to develop strong ties with
the state legislative and executive
branches, which can enhance its influ-
ence in government decisionmaking."57
Finally, a statewide CUB offers the
benefit of providing a "more integrated
and comprehensive approach to utility
energy policy."' 58 Local and regional
CUBs would not be able to foster a coor-
dinated energy policy for the entire state.
According to John Richard, an early
CUB organizer with Ralph Nader's Cen-
ter for Study of Responsive Law, region-
alism can create factionalism, with the
various regions working at cross-purpos-
es to one another.59 Kathleen O'Reilly
points out a related drawback. "Political
influence is very weakened by being a
regional CUB. You always have to deal
with a legislative body where the trade-
off between urban and rural votes is very
important."60
CUB leaders believe that many of the
benefits of a local CUB can be structured
into a statewide CUB. In the larger states
like California and New York, regional
offices could be established to develop
stronger grassroots support by specializ-
ing in utility-specific issues and pursuing
aggressive organizing on the local lev-
el. 6 1 Even without regional offices, the
Illinois CUB, which operates in a state
of nearly 12 million people, has succeed-
ed in developing active grassroots sup-
port for a variety of utility issues through
the combination of ambitious organizing
on the district level and the sophisticated
use of targeted mailings.
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Challenges to the CUB Concept
The CUB concept, whether struc-
tured on a local or statewide basis, is not
without its difficulties. CUBs face the
problem of finding willing and able vol-
unteers who will commit time .to the
organization, especially those who will
run for elected. office and serve on the
board of directors. Another potential dif-
ficulty confronting CUBs is one of iden-
tity. In states where administrative
offices of state government also advo-
cate for utility ratepayers, and/or where
other citizens groups intervene in utility
proceedings on behalf of their members,
CUBs may need to carve out areas of
specialization or otherwise determine in
which cases and in which capacity they
can best carry out their work.
Maintaining a Democratic Struc-
ture. Perhaps the most vexing organiza-
tional problem which CUBs face is
maintaining a truly democratic structure.
As the existing CUBs have experienced,
brand new CUBs have little difficulty
finding individuals willing to circulate
nominating petitions, gather the requisite
number of CUB members' signatures
and run for office. But as time goes on,
CUBs have found it difficult to attract
new activists to carry on when the origi-
nal "hard core" board members' terms
have expired and they are no longer will-
ing to run for office. It is common for
board members to serve more than one
term unopposed for election. When
board members are not willing to serve
an additional term, or are precluded from
doing so by the by-laws, some CUBs
have experienced board seats remaining
vacant for a period of time. Oregon CUB
director Kimberly Moore Webster
reports that it has sometimes been diffi-
cult to find candidates to run for office in
the state's smaller rural districts.
Potential candidates may find it
daunting to circulate nominating peti-
tions to the CUB members in their dis-
trict to gather the 30 signatures needed to
qualify for the ballot. UCAN director
Michael Shames says he has no trouble
finding people, who are willing to serve
on the board, but he does have a hard
time finding members who will run for
election. As a result, UCAN has not held
elections since 1988. The UCAN board,
according to Shames, is now "represen-
tative, but not elected."
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Illinois CUB director Susan Stewart
calls the process of gathering signatures
on a nominating petition "a pain." But
she is quick to point out that the require-
ment.has its purpose. Board members
must have some organizing skills if they
are to be effective. If they cannot obtain
support from at least 30 CUB members
in their district, they might not be appro-
priate to serve on the board. Stewart
characterizes the Illinois CUB's board of
directors as a working board. It meets six
times a year with subcommittee meet-
ings scheduled at other times. Board
members hold district meetings with
CUB members to discuss pending legis-
lation and regulatory proceedings and to
recommend actions which CUB mem-
bers can take. Directors are also fre-
quently called upon to make speeches
and be interviewed by the media.
Both the Illinois and Oregon CUBs
have maintained democratic elections of
board members, although both CUBs
have experienced times when there are
one or more vacancieg. As many as 40%
of Illinois CUB members vote in its elec-
tions. In recent elections, the Oregon
CUB has averaged about 10% of its
members voting.
A necessary part of maintaining a
democratic governance structure is fund-
ing the elections. As CUBs have learned,
democracy costs money; the expenses
for mailing informational fliers and bal-
lots is substantial. In order to streamline
the election process and reduce expens-
es, CUBs have learned to cut corners.
The Illinois CUB, for example, has mini-
mized the number of mailings it sends to
recruit candidates. In addition, it does
not mail ballots to members if there is an
uncontested race in a particular district.
CUB leaders do not have any easy
answers to the dilemma of democratic
governance. Perhaps the answers lie,
at least in part, in relentless organizing
and media exposure. For those CUBs
with an adequate budget to hire a full-
time organizer and carry out an active
public relations program, the ability to
continue to attract activists willing to run
for and serve on the board may be made
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somewhat easier because of the high vis-
ibility of the CUB.
In general, and where there is an ade-
quate critical mass of resources,-demo-
cratic elections serve very important and
basic purposes. They (1) legitimize the
governing body; (2) publicize the gover-
nance structure and its leaders; (3) pro-
vide a check on leadership abuse within
the organization; (4) periodically focus
the attention of the CUB directors on
those whom they seek to represent; and
(5) give the members a proper stake and
role in the organization which they fund
and which claims to represent them.
Competing Domains-The Turf
Myth. A citizens' "futility board," trum-
pets a January 1991 editorial headline in
a New York newspaper opposed to the
formation of a CUB there.64 The argu-
ment posited by the editorial, and heard
in every state where a CUB has been
proposed, is that another agency is not
needed to represent ratepayers in regula-
tory proceedings. If the regulatory com-
mission is doing its job, another organi-
zation is only redundant. Besides, say
CUB's detractors, the state already has a
Consumer Protection Board, and the
Attorney General's office also represents
consumers on occasion. A CUB, they
argue, is just another layer of bureaucra-
cy.
Depending on a state's advocacy
environment, a CUB in the beginning
stages of development may have to bat-
tle for its identity in much the same way
that the New York CUB is having to jus-
tify its existence in its current bid for
legitimacy. Bureaucratic redundancy is
an easy argument for CUB opponents to
make, and one that can be effective.
CUB supporters counter the criticism by
pointing out that CUBs are voluntary
organizations that require no taxpayer
dollars. Furthermore, the budgets of
existing government agencies are gener-
ally insufficient to intervene consistent-
ly, and government advocates are often
limited by financial and political con-
straints.
In reality, CUBs have not found that
their efforts duplicate those of govern-
ment organizations charged with repre-
senting ratepayers. On the contrary,
CUBs' efforts are often complementary,
contributing a unique perspective to reg-
ulatory proceedings that the government
proxy may be unable to offer because of
political, jurisdictional or budgetary lim-
itations. In California, for example,
when the Public Utilities Commission
created the Division of Ratepayer Advo-
cates to represent consumer interests in
utility proceedings, the Commission
itself noted that "the participation by
consumer groups tends to enhance the
record in our proceedings and comple-
ment the efforts of our Commission
staff."65
In Illinois, where there has been both
a CUB and a governor-appointed Office
of Consumer Services,66 CUB director
Susan Stewart reports that the two orga-
nizations have usually taken the same
positions on issues under consideration
by the Illinois Commerce Commission.
Their advocacy is complementary in that
they can, along with other intervenors,
divide the issues between them, co-spon-
sor and jointly fund expert witnesses,
and even file joint briefs when appropri-
ate. This allows maximum utilization of
scarce resources, especially in proceed-
ings that are phenomenally expensive
where, according to Stewart, "the com-
bined efforts of all consumer and gov-
ernmental intervenors may be outspent
10-1 by the utility."
CUBs can take positions that a gov-
ernment agency would be unlikely to
advocate. For example, the issue of "life-
line" rates for low-income consumers is
more apt to be spearheaded by a CUB
than by the state's consumer counsel. A
state agency tends to be charged with
broadly representing all consumers'
interests-both business and residen-
tial-whereas issues like lifeline and
winter disconnection policies affect a
subset of residential ratepayers, low-
income households.
Further, government agencies do not
tend to intervene in issues that pit one
class of ratepayers against another.
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While a CUB might intervene in a rate
design case in which it opposes rate
relief for a utility's business customers at
the expense of residential ratepayers, a
government office might choose to take
no position on that issue. A CUB is also
able to intervene in proceedings which
are so highly politicized that the admin-
istration may effectively restrict the
position which can be taken by the
state's consumer counsel.
CUBs' interaction with government
advocates is complementary in another,
albeit more subtle, way. According to
political scientist William Gormley,
CUBs "play a catalytic role in prodding
bureaucracies. Theirs is a constructive
role because they generate bureaucratic
responsiveness without a lot of the dys-
functionality that comes with control
from above. Their presence can give
bureaucracies enough discretion to make
decisions on their own." 68
The most significant difference
between the type of advocacy undertak-
en by CUBs and that of government
proxy representation is mobilization of
public support. CUBs can generate
grassroots support for consumer-benefi-
cial policies through letter-writing, testi-
mony at hearings, petitions and rallies.
In addition, CUB staff can actively lob-
by for legislation, activity which is for-
bidden of government proxies except
when requested by the legislature to tes-
tify at formal hearings. The mobilization
of members' support is often the crucial
element needed to convince decision-
makers to support consumer-oriented
reforms.
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In summary, the argument that a CUB
only duplicates the work already done by
offices within state government is more
a "red herring" intended to thwart the
formation of a CUB than a legitimate
criticism. The types of cases which
CUBs can promote as well as the posi-
tions they can advocate are significantly
different from, yet complementary of,
the ratepayer representation offered by
state government offices. Indeed, it is
highly likely that the most significant
difference between CUBs and govern-
ment proxies-the ability to marshall
grassroots support-is what CUB
detractors, especially the utilities and
their shareholders associations, are truly
attempting to thwart.
Variations on the CUB Structure
While CUBs have proven to be effec-
tive watchdogs of ratepayers' interests in
four states, the CUB concept as original-
ly proposed may not be appropriate or
even practical in all situations. There
will be some states in which CUB legis-
lation authorizing access to the mass
mailings of state agencies would be dif-
ficult if not impossible to pass.
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This report suggests that a CUB is not
necessarily dependent on the funding
mechanism of enclosures to be consid-
ered a CUB. As long as it is democrati-
cally governed and represents residential
ratepayers, a consumer organization can
function as a citizens' utility board. Sev-
eral alternatives are considered here.
Each scenario is based on a funding
source which provides a modicum of
financial stability for the organization.
One quasi-CUB scenario would be an
organization that is funded in part from a
state government appropriation obtained
through utility assessments and in part
from membership contributions. This
formula would ensure ongoing financial
stability at a minimum level of operation
as well as a degree of residential ratepay-
er representation. The statute or adminis-
trative ruling which authorizes the orga-
nization could include provisions for
democratic representation. It could also
require a minimum membership level in
order to retain funding from the state-
authorized appropriation.
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Members of the board of directors
would be elected by the membership in
each of the districts created throughout
the state. Like existing CUBs, these
could be congressional districts, combi-
nations of such districts or state senate
districts. The key criteria for the forma-
tion of districts would be that they are
somewhat similar in population and that
the number of districts created would not
be so numerous as to make board delib-
erations awkward, perhaps not to exceed
a board of fifteen members.
A second alternative is similar to the
first in both funding and governance.
But the scope of the organization would
be broadened to include advocacy in the
regulatory proceedings of financial and
insurance institutions in addition to
those of utilities. These are industries
where consumer representation is weak
and the stakes for consumers are high.
Because the controversial issues which
confront these industries are likely to
peak at different times, a multi-industry
organization may be more successful in
maintaining a stable membership base
than a citizens group focused solely on
utility issues.
Susan Stewart of the Illinois CUB
thinks that as time goes on, it might be
worthwhile for a CUB to explore
branching into other areas like finance
and insurance. "Obviously utilities are
very timely issues, but it doesn't make
sense to pigeonhole yourself into utility
issues forever if in fact those tend not to
be the pressing issues of the moment... I
suspect that consumers who are interest-
ed in utility issues probably are the same
class of consumers interested in insur-
ance and banking." She cautions any
organization that might take a multi-
industry approach not to abandon the
utility issues, however. "During the peri-
od when people fall asleep and are
ignoring the issue is when the greatest
damage gets done. Then you spend the
next decade or two trying to undo that
damage."
7'
A third alternative returns to utility
industry issues but departs somewhat
from the democratic governance require-
ment and.opens up the funding to any
number of consumer organizations inter-
ested in intervening in utility proceed-
ings. Borrowing the concept from
Michigan's Utility Consumer Represen-
tation Fund, a state could establish a
grant fund available to intervenors on a
competitive basis. The grant program
would be funded by assessments on util-
ities. Consumer groups would apply
annually for funds to support what they
foresee to be their caseload for the com-
ing year.
The advantage of such a program is
that consumer groups would be awarded
funds in advance, enabling them to plan
and administer their advocacy work
accordingly. The board which oversees
the fund would be appointed in such a
way as to avoid both political favoritism
and attempts to blackball grantees who
take "unpopular" positions. Some board
members could be appointed by the gov-
ernor and others by legislative leaders on
both sides of the aisle. In addition, one or
more board members could be appointed
by prominent statewide consumer orga-
nizations in order to ensure that grass-
roots interests are represented. Not all
consumer organizations that apply to the
grant fund would necessarily be demo-
cratically governed. But this alternative
does offer the potential advantage of
bringing a variety of residential ratepay-
er viewpoints into regulatory proceed-
ings.
A variation on this approach which
departs from the competitive grant pro-
cess would be to establish an intervenor
compensation fund that is available to all
qualified intervenors. Organizations that
intervene in regulatory proceedings on
behalf of residential ratepayers would be
reimbursed for their contributions. The
ideal program would compensate partici-
pants throughout the regulatory process
rather than after the fact. It would honor
marketplace rates as well as the full
extent of intervenors' participation
rather than compensating intervenors at
lower than market rates for only a por-
tion of their involvement, as does the
current California system.
In each of these scenarios the utility
assessments that create the intervenor
compensation program could be
obtained in a number of ways. Consumer
representation could be funded by a
straight assessment on the major energy
and telephone utilities, similar to the
Michigan program. A second funding
strategy would permit the.state's regula-
tory commission to assess a value on the
extra space in utility billing envelopes.
The utilities would be required to "sell"
the space either to themselves or to com-
mercial advertisers and contribute the
revenues to the state's intervenor com-
pensation program.72 A third approach
would be to require the utilities to con-
tribute a percentage of whatever they
spend to advocate their own interests in
regulatory proceedings to an intervenor
compensation fund. Former Wisconsin
CUB director Kathleen O'Reilly calls
this the "three percent solution." She
points out that this approach also poses
the advantage of providing an incentive
for utilities to minimize their own advo-
cacy expenditures.
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These suggested departures from the
traditional CUB funding scheme are not
meant to lose sight of the "citizens" in
the citizens' utility board concept. If an
intervenor compensation program were
to serve as a major source of a CUB's
revenue, the organization must remain
grounded in the key points central to the
CUB concept: it must be membership-
based, obtaining a substantial portion of
its revenue from members' contribu-
tions; and it must be structured demo-
cratically or, at the very least, in such a
way that the governing body is represen-
tative of and accountable to the mem-
bers. These measures would ensure that
the organization continues to focus on
the concerns of residential ratepayers. In
addition, the administrative body that
oversees the intervenor compensation
fund should be separate from the regula-
tory commission. Structural separation is
necessary to ensure that the award pro-
cess is not subject to bias based on the
positions taken by intervenors in regula-
tory proceedings.
Fitting Form to Circumstances
Population size will dictate to some
extent the method of funding and form
of governance most appropriate to CUBs
in different states. For a state with a
small or even medium population, total
reliance upon state agency mass mail-
ings is not likely to attract a sufficient
membership base to raise enough money
for the organization to intervene in the
full gamut of regulatory, court and leg-
islative proceedings of the state's energy
and telephone utilities. In a "best-case
scenario," both state agency inserts and
intervenor compensation would be avail-
able to CUBs, especially those in states
with smaller populations. The CUB
would take advantage of state agency
mass mailings to insert membership
solicitations during a start-up period of
at least three years in order to establish a
sizable membership base. In the ensuing
years, the CUB could renew its use of
state agency inserts on an infrequent
basis in order to reach utility consumers
who have more recently been added to
the mailing list. At the same time, the
CUB would receive intervenor compen-
sation for its participation in regulatory
proceedings, an important stabilizing
element when membership revenue
reaches a plateau or declines. A state
with a large population appears to have
a sufficient critical mass to sustain a
viable CUB on an ongoing basis by rely-
ing on state agency mass mailings and
aggressive direct mail caipaigns to
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draw sufficient contributions to pursue
an active caseload, as the Illinois CUB
demonstrates.
Political climate and regulatory envi-
ronment will ultimately dictate whether
or not a state legislature or regulatory
commission is likely to authorize a
CUB's use of state agency mailings
and/or establish an intervenor funding
program. At present, only two
states-Illinois and New York-have
authorized CUBs to insert messages in
state agency mailings. And only a hand-
ful of states support active intervenor
compensation programs.
Political scientist William Gormley's
analysis of the varying levels of public
advocacy among the states may shed
some light on which states could be
expected to authorize funding support
for CUBs.74 He indicates that states with
high utility rates and appointed public
utility commissioners are more likely to
support a high level of public advocacy,
either by proxy advocates or grassroots
organizations or both. On the other hand,
states with lower rates and elected com-
missioners tend to show lower levels of
public advocacy on behalf of residential
ratepayers.
Extrapolation of his model to CUBs
would suggest that states with controver-
sial utility rates and/or policies and
where the regulatory commission is
appointed would be more conducive to
generating the necessary popular support
to establish funding mechanisms for
CUBs. Such public pressure could lead
to legislative action as in Wisconsin and
Illinois, citizens initiative as in Oregon,
a ruling by the regulatory commission as
occurred in California, or even executive
order by the governor, New York's expe-
rience.
If form is to truly follow function, it
is imperative that the method of funding
and form of governance that are adopted
lend themselves to supporting the mis-
sion of CUBs-by fostering an organi-
zation that is representative of and
accountable to the broad spectrum of
residential ratepayers, that provides
members with a vehicle for organizing
themselves and for participating in the
regulatory process, and that is sufficient-
ly funded to hire the expertise necessary
to advocate on behalf of residential
ratepayers.
CONCLUSIONS:
THE FUTURE OF CUBS
This report has examined the evolu-
tion of CUBs from Ralph Nader's pro-
posal in the 1970s to the formation of
CUBs in Wisconsin, Illinois, California,
Oregon and now New York. It tracks the
effects of the utilities' challenges to bill
inserts and the difficulties CUBs faced
after the loss of enclosure privileges in
the 1986 Supreme Court case, PGE v.
PUC. And it discusses alternative meth-
ods of funding CUBs, with emphasis on
intervenor compensation.
The relevance of CUBs is as strong
today as it was in the 1970s when Nader
first proposed that messages inserted in
utility bills be used to organize con-
sumers into voluntary nonprofit con-
sumer organizations. The need for a
means to organize and empower con-
sumers may be even more compelling
now than it was then. Real income has
dropped for most Americans since the
1970s.' The gap between the rich and
poor has widened dramatically. Corpo-
rate mergers have created multinational
conglomerates that control an ever-
broadening array of consumer goods and
services. In short, consumers face even
stiffer challenges in attempting to shape
the market to their real needs and in
building effective mechanisms to redress
their grievances.
The early promise of the CUB con-
cept and the very real successes demon-
strated by the existing CUBs on behalf
of residential ratepayers leads to a con-
sideration of the future of CUBs. Where
do CUBs go from here? What are the
major issues facing utility consumers in
the 1990s and beyond, and what role can
CUBs play in addressing them? Does the
CUB concept have relevance beyond the
energy and telephone utilities?
Applicability of the CUB
Concept to Other Forums
When Ralph Nader advocated that
informational inserts placed in the regu-
lar mailings of certain industries be used
to organize consumers into associations,
his proposal extended to far more arenas
than the public utilities. He envisioned
that, in addition to legal monopolies, a
notice inviting customers to join a con-
sumer organization be included in the
mailings of all companies that use pre-
printed contracts, called contracts of
adhesion. Such contracts include insur-
ance policies, landlord leases, install-
ment loan arrangements and war-
ranties.75 Three industries in particular
have since been singled out by consumer
activists for the formation of CUB-like
organizations-financial institutions, the
insurance industry and the postal ser-
vice.
Financial Services. The past decade
has witnessed the deregulation of the
financial services industry and, with it,
the most serious financial crisis since the
Depression of the 1930s. The power of
the savings and loan (S&L) and banking
industries to promote legislation and reg-
ulations that serve their own interests has
far outweighed governmental considera-
tion of consumers' interests. Even
though consumers support the federal
depository insurance system (and now
the bailout of the S&L industry) with tax
dollars, their interests have been accord-
ed little weight before Congress, state
legislatures, state and federal regulatory
agencies and the courts.
Consumer advocates propose the for-
mation of consumer organizations at the
national and/or state levels that would
give consumers a much-needed voice in
the regulation of this most powerful
industry. Such organizations would also
provide information to consumers to
help them navigate the increasingly
complex maze of choices facing them in
a deregulated environment.
At the national level, the U.S. Public
Interest Research Group (U.S. PIRG),
the Center for Study of Responsive Law
(CSRL), and Public Citizen have pro-
posed the formation of a nationwide
Financial Consumers' Association
(FCA) based on the CUB concept. U.S.
Representatives Charles Schumer and
Joe Kennedy introduced FCA legislation
in 1991 as an amendment to H.R. 1505,
a package of broad banking reforms
under consideration in Congress.
The proposed FCA is described as "a
public purpose, democratically con-
trolled, self-funded, nationwide mem-
bership association of inancial service
consumers" charged with educating con-
sumers and representing them in finan-
cial service matters.76 Four times per
year, all federally insured banks, credit
unions and savings and loans would be
required to include inserts in their mail-
ings that describe the purpose of the
association and invite customers to join
the organization. Compliance with the
enclosure requirement would be a condi-
tion for receiving federal deposit insur-
ance. Like CUBs, the membership fee
would be kept low-a proposed $10 per
year-to attract a broad cross-section of
consumers, particularly low- and moder-
ate-income households.
The quarterly inserts, prepared by the
FCA, would adhere to strict weight limi-
tations; inserts weighing less than .35
ounce would incur no mailing charges
for the FCA. The FCA would be
required to certify that the insert text is
neither false nor misleading. Banks that
object to the content of inserts would
have the right to appeal to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The FCA would establish regional
and local offices in order to foster grass-
roots participation in association mat-
ters. Representatives would be elected to




a policymaking board by members from
each congressional district. A smaller
board of directors charged with manag-
ing the association would be elected
from these delegates. The proposed leg-
islation mandates that the board be com-
posed of individuals outside the finan-
cial services industry, and that campaign
contributions be limited in order to avoid
control by special interests.
According to U.S. PIRG, the FCA
would function as a combination watch-
dog/educator. Its staff of experts would
monitor legislative and regulatory activi-
ties and lobby for consumer-beneficial
reforms, thereby countervailing the pow-
erful influences of the financial services
industry.77 The FCA would publish
localized shopping guides for its mem-
bers, explaining the more complex prod-
ucts and services of the financial indus-
try, alerting consumers to unfair
practices and providing comparative
information on fees and services.
Predictably, the FCA faces strong
opposition from banking trade groups
who claim that the financial services
industry currently receives sufficient
government oversight.78 Further, they
argue, financial services are dissimilar to
public utilities in that they are private
enterprises, not regulated monopoly ser-
vice providers. Unlike the utilities, they
do not have a guaranteed rate of return.
And when they fail, as the S&L crisis
has demonstrated, financial institutions
can be liquidated. FCA proponents
counter these arguments by citing the
importance of the financial industry to
the overall health of the economy and
noting the vested interest of taxpayers
because of their support of the deposit
insurance system.
Similar measures have recently been
introduced via state legislation in Illi-
nois, New York and California.79 In Illi-
nois, FCA legislation has been drafted
by Pat Quinn, a long-time CUB activist
elected to the office of state treasurer in
1990 on a pro-consumer banking agen-
da. His proposed legislation received
strong public support in advisory refer-
enda held in five counties in the Novem-
ber 1990 general election. However,
popular support did not translate into
legislative victory. H.1515 was defeated
in the 1991 general assembly due to
strong lobbying by the banking and
insurance industries.80 The Illinois FCA
bill differed from federal legislation in
that it sought state agency envelope
access rather than enclosures in the mail-
ings of financial services. FCA backers
in Illinois hoped to avoid the first
amendment challenges expected from a
proposal mandating direct industry
enclosures.
Insurance Industry. To most con-
sumers, insurance payments are virtually
as inescapable as utility bills. In the past
decade, insurance rates have risen dra-
matically at the same time that coverage
has been reduced. Health and automo-
bile insurance policies have become
unaffordable for a substantial number of
households. Disastrous consequences
have befallen many who are unable to
acquire adequate insurance or are unin-
sured altogether, such as denial of health
care, loss of life savings and foreclosure
on the family home. While public opin-
ion is highly critical of the insurance
industry, consumers have had little voice
in ratemaking and policysetting proceed-
ings because they have not been able to
organize their efforts effectively.
Public Citizen, a Washington D.C.-
based consumer organization, recom-
mends the formation of CUB-like orga-
nizations at the state and federal levels to
function as watchdogs over the insur-
ance industry, similar in operation to the
FCA discussed above. In a 1990
report,8 1 Public Citizen proposed sweep-
ing reforms to the insurance industry,
including the establishment of "citizens'
insurance boards," to avert the kind of
insolvency crisis experienced by the
S&L industry. Such boards would partic-
ipate in regulatory proceedings on behalf
of consumers to ensure that consumer
interests receive the same kind of repre-
sentation currently afforded the insur-
ance industry.
In California the concept of a state
citizens' insurance board received strong
public support as part of a package of
insurance reforms placed on the Novem-
ber 1988 ballot as Proposition 103. The
successful initiative, drafted by the con-
sumer group Voter Revolt, mandated
major reforms that included rate roll-
backs, discounts for good drivers, public
disclosure of industry operations, an
intervenor compensation program and
the formation of a nonprofit corporation
to represent consumers in insurance pro-
ceedings.
The initiative required insurers to
enclose notices in each annual policy or
renewal premium informing policyhold-
ers of the opportunity to join an indepen-
dent nonprofit corporation. The insur-
ance commissioner, an elected position
as established by Proposition 103, would
determine the content of the enclosures.
The purpose of the organization would
be to advocate the interests of insurance
consumers before proceedings of the
Department of Insurance, courts and the
legislature. The organization would be
funded solely by membership contribu-
tions and would receive no legislative
appropriation. Members would elect a
board of directors to govern the organi-
zation.
While there was some question as to
the constitutionality of the provision in
light of PG&E v. PUC, the clause was
struck down for an unrelated reason. The
California Supreme Court ruled that the
California Constitution prohibits a citi-
zens initiative from establishing a pri-
vate corporation and empowering it to
perform prescribed functions.82 At this
writing, the Insurance Commissioner is
examining a variety of methods to
address consumers' grievances and
involve consumers in the regulatory pro-
cess.
The Postal Service. Under the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1971, the U.S.
Postal Service came under the corporate-
style direction of a Board of Governors
comprised primarily of business execu-
tives. The oversight that had once been a
function of Congress was largely elimi-
nated, and with it went the mechanism
that allowed individual postal customers
to influence postal policy through their
elected representatives. In the ensuing
two decades, postal customers have
experienced dramatically increased
rates-from 6¢ to 29¢ for a first-class
stamp-and, at the same time, signifi-
cant reductions in service.
To return a measure of accountability
to the postal service, Ralph Nader has
advocated the establishment of a non-
profit Post Office Consumer Action
Group (POCAG), modeled on the CUB
concept.83 Pursuant to congressional
authority, the postal service would be
required to deliver POCAG mailings
twice a year free of charge to all residen-
tial postal addresses. The mailings
would solicit membership in POCAG
through voluntary contributions of $10 a
year. POCAG staff would be authorized
to represent individual postal customers
before the Postal Rate Commission,
Congress and the courts.
Among the policies advocated by
Nader would be "affordable first-class
postage, the prompt delivery of mail,
broader use for post offices, and... [chal-
lenges to] other cutbacks in services."
84
POCAG's mission, in short, would be to
prevent the postal service from becom-
ing a system available only to those who
can afford it.
In summary, CUB-like organizations
for the financial services and insurance
industries as well as the postal service
offer the promise of increasing their
accountability to consumers who at pre-
sent are held captive to services and rates
over which they have little control.
While such organizations have yet to be
established, interest in pro-consumer
legislation is growing at the state and
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national levels. As the harmful impacts
of deregulation become more evident,
consumers and decisionmakers are like-
ly to look more seriously at the benefits
of consumer associations modeled on
the CUB concept.
CUBs in the 1990s
Issues Facing CUBs. CUBs and con-
sumer organizations modeled on the
CUB concept face a tall order in the
1990s. The deregulation of some of the
country's largest industries means that
consumers are required to make crucial
decisions in an increasingly complex
and confusing marketplace. Consumers
need reliable sources of information as
well as mechanisms for joining forces in
order to advocate their interests before
regulatory and legislative bodies.
Telephone services are at the top of
every CUB's advocacy agenda. Issues
such as rate restructuring,85.the introduc-
tion of local measured service86 and
Caller ID 87 are but a few proposals that
will have majorimpacts on rates paid by
consumers and the ways consumers use
the telephone network. Since the divesti-
ture of AT&T in 1984, consumers have
been faced with an almost overwhelm-
ing array of decisions regarding services
and new technologies. With the process
of deregulation continuing at both the
state and federal levels, regulators will
be deciding upon public policy issues
that have the potential to revolutionize
the structure of the telephone industry.
Depending on the ability of CUBs and
other consumer advocates to argue for
policies that benefit residential ratepay-
ers, consumers may face the prospect of
a telephone system that is increasingly
complex and less accessible to low- and
moderate-income customers.
The energy utilities are restructuring
in much the same way as has the tele-
phone system since the divestiture of
AT&T. Even though the rate shocks of
the 1970s and early 1980s have largely
subsided, importht electricity and gas
decisions are being made that will have
ramifications ten to fifteen years from
now. Merger proposals, the formation of
unregulated holding companies, the cre-
ation of a power grid that would be
structured as a common carrier (similar
to the telephone system)-all are com-
plex and vitally important issues that are
likely to escape the attention of residen-
tial ratepayers unless their interests are
represented by professionals with suffi-
cient expertise to understand the issues
and argue their case effectively in regu-
latory proceedings.
Model for the 1990s. CUBs offer a
compelling "model for the 1 990s,"88 not
only for utilities issues but other indus-
tries such as insurance and finance
where consumers have traditionally had
little power to affect the outcome of reg-
ulatory proceedings. They provide a
unique combination of characteristics
not found in government offices charged
with representing ratepayers. CUBs not
only advocate for consumers, but also
give their members a platform on which
to participate in the regulatory process.
On the one hand, they empower individ-
uals by providing information and
instructions on how to participate
through such actions as letter-writing
and testifying at hearings. On the other
hand, they employ the technical exper-
tise necessary to act on members' behalf
in regulatory proceedings. Both sides of
the equation--empowerment and advo-
cacy-are required for effective repre-
sentation of consumers' interests.
While CUBs offer an ideal model for
mobilizing and representing consumers,
a further factor enters into the equa-
tion-funding. Without a stable ongoing
source of funding, CUBs are ill-
equipped to meet the rigors of participat-
ing in the regulatory process-analyzing
the issues, hiring attorneys and expert
witnesses when necessary, communicat-
ing with members on a regular basis and
organizing members to take collective
action.
The early CUB architects proposed
that membership contributions obtained
through solicitations inserted in utility
billing envelopes provide that funding
source. The method proved to be suc-
cessful in three CUBs until the utilities
challenged the practice in PG&E v. PUC.
The Illinois CUB's subsequent use of
state agency mailings promises to be a
communications and fundraising vehicle
virtually as effective as utility bill
inserts. States that pursue the formation
of CUBs, as New York has recently
done, are likely to adopt the Illinois
practice.
But states with small populations
may need to look beyond the vehicle of
state agency mass mailings for a stable
funding source. With populations of two
million and less, membership appeals
inserted in state mass mailings are not
likely to generate sufficient revenue
beyond the first few years of use to fund
a viable CUB, not when participation in
a single regulatory proceeding can cost
tens of thousands of dollars. And those
states where the political climate is
inhospitable to CUB legislation modeled
on the Illinois statute will also need to
look elsewhere for a source of funding
that can keep the CUB operating on an
even keel when membership contribu-
tions fluctuate.
This report advocates intervenor
compensation programs as a supplement
and even an alternative to the funding
vehicle of membership enclosures in
state agency mass mailings. If the pro-
gram is adequately funded and compen-
sates qualified intervenors when the pro-
ceeding are in progress rather than after
the fact, intervenor compensation can
provide a reliable funding base for ongo-
ing CUB support.
However funded, the continued
establishment of CUBs is not expected
to occur without considerable opposition
from the utilities.89 No CUB has come
into being without a struggle; and once
established, none has experienced easy
sailing. Nonetheless, the case for CUBs
is strong and, as the four existing CUBs
have demonstrated, strong enough to
prevail against the formidable barriers
erected by the utilities.
The messages of consumer empower-
ment by banding together in democratic
organizations, and of self-help rather
than tax-supported government interven-
tion, deserve a broad hearing. As such,
this report is meant to serve as a testimo-
ny to the viability of the CUB concept
and a practical guide for those consider-
ing the establishment of consumer orga-
nizations based on the CUB model.
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